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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a business tort case where Amazon third-party seller Thimes 
Solutions Inc. was destroyed as a direct result of defendants’ publication of false 
counterfeiting accusations made to Amazon.  TP-Link USA Corporation (“TP-
Link” or “USA”) and Auction Brothers, Inc. dba Amazzia (“Amazzia”) libeled 
plaintiff on 28 separate occasions, accusing it of listing--not selling—counterfeit 
TP-Link products.  Plaintiff tried to reason with TP-Link/Amazzia . . . but they 
refused to engage.  
Plaintiff’s conduct in all instances was lawful under the First Sale Doctrine.1  
Under that doctrine a trademark holder enjoys a “distribution right” and may 
initially sell, or not sell, trademarked items to others on such terms as he or she 
sees fit. However, the trademark holder’s exclusive distribution right is limited to 
the first sale of the trademarked item. The distribution right may be exercised 
 
1 William Fikhman, CTO of Auction Brothers, Inc. dba Amazzia (according to Amazzia Rule 
26(a)(1) disclosure), advocated for the First Sale Doctrine when sued under dba “Super Duper 
Deals” in Vivo Per Lei, Inc., a Nevada corporation v. Gadi Bruchim, an individual, William 
Fikhman, an individual, et al, CV11- 05169GW (CDCA 2011).  See “Defendant William 
Fikhman’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss,” id. at ECF No. 44, filed December 6, 
2012, attached to Declaration of Mark Schlachet (“Schlachet Dec.”) filed concurrently herewith, 
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solely with respect to the initial disposition . . .  not to prevent or restrict a lawful 
purchaser’s listing, resale or further transfer of possession. 
Amazon is fully aware of the foregoing and will not enforce IP complaints 
against a third-party seller such as plaintiff for listing or selling trademarked goods 
subsequent to their initial distribution.  To circumvent Amazon’s limitations on IP 
enforcement, defendants lied to Amazon and falsely accused plaintiff of conduct 
Amazon does deem actionable, i.e. counterfeiting, when defendants never had a 
good faith belief that plaintiff counterfeited.  As a result of these lies, Thimes was 
expelled from the Amazon platform and may longer sell on Amazon. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On May 29, 2019 Plainitff filed this Thimes action before the United States 
District Court for the Southerrn District of New York (“SDNY”) in libel and 
tortious interference with existing and prospective economic relations, to recover 
damages and for declaratory relief to the effect that plaintiff’s conduct in 
marketing TP-Link products was and is lawful.2  On December 6, 2019 District 
Judge Valerie Caproni conducted a Case Management Conference in Thimes and 
expressed herself strongly that, because the “related case” of Careful Shopper LLC 
v. TP-Link USA Corporation, et al. was pending before Judge Staton in this United 
 
2 Thimes Solutions Inc. v. TP Link USA Corporation et al (“Thimes”), Case No. 
1:19−cv−04970−VEC (SDNY). 
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States District Court for the Central District of California (“CDCA”), Thimes 
should be transferred to CDCA  With Plaintiff’s consent Judge Caproni entered the 
order transferring venue that same day.  (Thimes, at ECF No.51) 
Following transfer of venue to this Honorable Court, Plaintiff TSI filed a 
Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 78 on January 13, 2020), following Court 
order to comply with rules relating to the correct assertion of diversity jurisdiction.  
The Second Amended Complaint added a Sherman Act claim to the two state law 
claims of Tortious Interference with Business Relations and Trade Libel.  The two 
State law claims have been pled substantially verbatim since commencement in 
SDNY on May 29, 2019. 
III. FACTS 
TSI became a third-party seller on Amazon in 2016.  To become an Amazon 
seller TSI signed Amazon’s standard Business Solutions Agreement that, among 
other things, allowed Amazon to terminate TSI as a seller for any reason or for no 
reason at all.  (SAC at ¶6)  TP-Link USA Corporation operates as an indirect 
subsidiary of TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd., a Chinese parent company.  The 
parent TP-Link has lately been the world's number one provider of Wi-Fi products.  
(Id. at ¶13)  USA retained Amazzia to monitor specific TP-Link products on the 
Amazon marketplace and do a “third-party seller clean up” of those selling TP-
Link products outside TP-Link’s authorized distribution channels.  (Id.  at ¶20)  
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 USA and Amazzia published 28 written complaints to Amazon charging 
Plaintiff with infringing TP-Link intellectual property by listing or selling on 
amazon.com counterfeit goods (on 27 occasions), or otherwise infringing a 
trademark (on one occasion)  (“IP Complaints”). (Id. at ¶18)  TP-Link’s fraudulent 
IP complaints directly caused plaintiff’s suspension from the Marketplace in May 
2018 and also caused TSI’s permanent expulsion as a seller on the Amazon 
website, effective on or about August 27, 2018.  (Id. at ¶19) 
Amazzia describes itself as affording Amazon marketplace sellers “price 
protection” by reporting and removing third-party sellers that discount trademarked 
products (Id.  at ¶¶21-22). According to Amazzia, the “main risk involves 
companies deviating from your minimum advertised price.”  (Id.  at ¶24)  Amazzia 
entered into a TP-Link-Amazon Brand Protection Agreement under which (i) 
Amazzia committed to an “Amazon cleanup,” (ii) TP-Link provided Amazzia with 
specific ASIN’s to be watched, (iii) Amazzia promised to “report non-compliant 
sellers to Amazon until they are removed by Amazon,” and (iv) Amazzia’s 
commitment was to rid the Marketplace of “resellers” as follows: “50% of resellers 
to be removed in 60 days, 75% in 90 days, and 90% in 120 days.”  (Id.  at ¶25)  
Unable to eliminate TSI sales as “unauthorized” or “discounted”—all perfectly 
lawful--Amazzia sent fraudulent IP complaints to Amazon charging Plaintiff with 
counterfeiting, at all times acting in concert with TP-Link.  (Id.  at ¶26)  During 
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2018 TP-Link/Amazzia complained to Amazon on at least 28 separate occasions, 
all or substantially all of which alleged counterfeiting.  (Id.  at ¶28)  TP-
Link/Amazzia coordinated their assault with four (4) different identities in 
complaining to Amazon, to wit:  compliance-us@tp link.com, compliance-usa@tp-
link.com, us-compliance@tp-link.com and compliance.usa@tp-link.com.  (Id.  at 
¶29) 
Amazon’s IP Infringement Reporting System is rife with abuse vis-à-vis 
unethical sellers and IP owners that “game the system” with bogus IP, trademark, 
copyright and patent reports.  (Id.  at ¶30)  TP-Link made four (4) test purchases of 
authentic products from TSI beginning on January 18, 2019 and, thus, all of its IP 
complaints for counterfeiting (the first being on January 19, 2019) were knowingly 
false.3  (Id. at ¶32)  Amazon nevertheless stated that it would act favorably if TP-
Link/Amazzia would retract the accusations; but, despite TSI requesting a 
retraction and asking for evidence of TP-Link/Amazzia's claims, both directly and 
through counsel, TP-Link/Amazzia refused to retract the IP complaints or even 
respond to TSI or its counsel at all; and indeed continued to file dozens of new 
complaints afterwards.  (Id. at ¶64)  Defendants’ acts destroyed Plaintiff’s 
relationship with Amazon, thereby causing the destruction of Plaintiff’s Amazon 
 
3 SAC at ¶27, bullets 3 and 4. 
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business. TSI’s last six (6) months of unimpeded Amazon-related operations 
showed net profits of $368,000.  (Id. at ¶65) 
TP-Link has no justification for its counterfeiting accusation.  It seeks to 
obfuscate, however, by advancing a purported justification for trademark 
infringement complaints, wholly irrelevant to this case.  Defendants claim that TSI 
could not convey TP-Link’s original manufacturer’s warranty to its purchasers 
because, the theory goes, TP-Link disclaimed its original manufacturer’s warranty 
as to Grey Market Goods, thus rendering such goods “materially different” and 
subject to a trademark infringement claim under law.   
 However Amazon, as a matter of policy and with respect to TP-Link 
specifically, has refused to enforce TP-Link’s claims of trademark infringement. 
See  SAC at ¶50n.16 and accompanying text.  TP-Link has never explained how, 
even if it had a good faith trademark infringement concern, it would be justified in 
accusing plaintiff of counterfeiting.  As to New York sellers (such as TSI) 
moreover, a special statutory provision (NYGBL §369-b), operative here, renders 
manufacturers’ warranty disclaimers based on Grey Market Sales null and void.  
SAC at ¶40.  TP-Link never enforced any warranty disclaimer, as to any purchaser, 
prior to the filing of instant litigation against it.   (¶¶33, 36-40)  This entire 
“warranty ploy” is a hoax. 
IV. RULE 12(b)(6) ANALYSIS 
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A. The Legal Standard 
This Court has consistently articulated the correct legal standard to 
adjudicate a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. E.g., Daar v. Oakley, Inc., 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 231237 at **3-4 (C.D. Cal.  2018)(“The Ninth Circuit is particularly 
hostile to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”)  Under that standard, as all 
Judges looking at false counterfeit complaints to Amazon have ruled, this case is 
plausible if, indeed, not compelling.  See Section IV.C. infra. 
B.  Defendants’ Primary Defense Does Not Go to SAC Sufficiency and 
is Not True—Not Even a Little Bit 
 
Woven into TP-Link/Amazzia’s factual statement and arguments on 
causation is a matter in avoidance, to wit, that, even if Defendants lied as alleged 
and caused TSI’s expulsion and economic harm, Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to 
state a claim because, subsequent to being suspended and thereafter expelled from 
the Amazon Platform, TSI had an opportunity, which it failed to implement, to 
establish to Amazon’s satisfaction the authenticity of its products, and thereby 
successfully overturn its loss of selling privileges.4   Thus employing a frequently-
encountered defense tactic, Defendants have conjured up pleading requirements 
that are actually the flip side of movant’s defensive matter, and have little to do 
with the allegations required to sufficiently state a claim and survive a Rule 
 
4 “Plaintiff does not allege that it provided any further information about the authenticity of its 
products.” Defendants’ Mem. at p. 3. 
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12(b)(6) motion.  See  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 64 L. 
Ed. 2d 572 (1980) (“finding ‘no basis for imposing on plaintiff an obligation 
to anticipate [an affirmative] defense by stating it his complaint’ its negative.”).  
This Court has opined accordingly.  Am. Nat'l Trading Corp. v. McGladrey & 
Pullen, LLP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135692, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2009)(“The SAC 
does not specify the nature of the sale of AM&G, nor is it something, in this 
instance, that ANTC should be required to allege to satisfy the federal pleading 
standard.”) 
In fact, however, TSI made extensive efforts to appeal and rectify its 
Policy Violations, suspensions, and expulsion.  Although TP-Link ignores 
the allegation, plaintiff has alleged that it “exhausted all possible 
administrative options at Amazon, including appellate procedures.”  SAC at 
¶52.  For example, immediately upon receipt of the first IP-complaint of 
January 19, 2018 Plaintiff emailed TP-Link at the designated address in an 
effort to satisfy TP-Link that TSI’s product was authentic and not 
counterfeit.  SAC at ¶42 and Exhibit 5.  TP-Link refused to engage. Id.  
Plaintiff engaged expert Amazon counsel who emailed a letter to TP-Link 
on February 1, 2018, but TP-Link again did not respond to counsel’s letter.  
SAC at ¶44 and Exhibit 6.  Plaintiff appealed to Amazon and got reinstated 
from a subsequent May 7th suspension, but TP-Link continued its onslaught 
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on May 28 and 30, and on June 14 and 21.  SAC at ¶46 and Exhibit 8.  
Despite its exhaustion of internal remedies, TSI was expelled on August 27, 
2018.5 
The truth is that the key to retractions and overturning succeeding 
suspensions is the IP owner’s voluntary action, without which a retraction 
and reinstatement is virtually impossible to achieve.  SAC at ¶64.6  There is 
no genuine opportunity for the accused to overturn Amazon’s 
suspension/expulsion without the complaining IP owner’s assistance, which 
in this case TSI sought but Defendants refused to discuss.7  And this whole 
discussion (dehors the pleadings) of TSI’s efforts to establish its innocence 
post facto begs the question:  did TP-Link/Amazzia’s false IP complaints 
libel TSI and tortiously interfere with TSI’s business relationships in the 
first instance? 
 
5 Amazon advises: “Most reviews are completed within 30 days; however, we may extend the 
review period at our discretion . . . We will notify you of our decision when the account review is 
complete.”  https://sellercentral.amazon.com/forums/t/how-long-does-it-take-for-amazon-to-
review-your-seller-account/206457/2  See Schlachet Dec. at Exhibit 8. 
6 Amazon Expert Chris Mc Cabe’s Declaration in Johnson v. John Does, Case No. 18-00689, 
ECF 34 (E.D. VA filed January 10, 2019), opines at ¶13: “[t]hat means the seller must obtain a 
retraction from the rights owner (or their agent) and have the rights owner contact Amazon 
directly to withdraw the claim against the seller.”  See Declaration of Chris McCabe (McCabe 
Dec.), annexed to Declaration of Mark Schlachet as Exhibit 2 thereto. 
7 McCabe Dec. at ¶¶11,14. 
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C. All Authorities to Date Deny Rule 12 (b)(6) Motions to Dismiss 
Defamation and Tortious Interference Claims Following IP 
(Counterfeit) Complaints to Amazon8 
 
Three United States District Judges have adjudicated Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
by IP owners advancing “specificity” arguments similar to those made here.  All 
three Rule 12(b)(6) motions were denied, finding the statement as reported by 
Amazon, i.e. “counterfeit,” sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In Eternity 
Mart, Inc. v. Nature's Sources, LLC 1:19-cv-02436 (N.D. IL filed April 10, 2019),  
the District Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, setting forth his reasoning in part 
as follows: “defendant falsely told Amazon that goods were counterfeit on 
February 6th of 2019. That's pretty specific. That's not conclusory allegations. I 
mean, that is one specific allegation. There's a lot more context around that.”9  
Similarly, in Johnson v. Incopro, Inc. et al, 1:18-cv-00689 (E.D. VA) Honorable 
Leonie M. Brinkema denied a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, ruling firmly that “that word 
‘counterfeit’ is very strong  and “there's no question that there's been serious 
interference between Ms. Johnson's business and Amazon.” 10 Further, the Court in 
SZS Sols., Inc. v. Brother Int'l Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106093 *6 (S.D. Fla.  
 
8 “In the absence of any California authority on the issue, the Court considered persuasive 
authority from other jurisdictions.”  Wolfstein v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, No. CV 15-
7150 PA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14497, at *23 (C.D. Cal.  2016). 
 
9 Transcript of Ruling annexed as Exhibit 3 to Schlachet Declaration.  See p.2, lines 13-25. 
10 Transcript of Ruling annexed as Exhibit 4 to Schlachet Declaration.  See p.7, line 10 through 
p.8, line 5.  
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2018) (IP complaint of trademark infringement only) ruled that “[p]laintiff's 
original complaint satisfied the liberal pleading standard required by Iqbal: the 
Complaint described the allegedly defamatory statement and stated when it was 
communicated to Amazon by Brother.”  
This District has opined in judicial dicta that a false accusation of 
counterfeiting (which did not occur in that case but has occurred here) would 
satisfy the “wrongful act” element of a tortious interference claim.11  Beyond cavil, 
an accusation that a business offers counterfeit goods is an accusation of highly 
culpable conduct . . . easily satisfying the “specificity” and “wrongful act” 
requirement of both state law tort claims. 
D. Trade Libel 
Under California law, "trade libel is an intentional disparagement of the 
quality of property, which results in pecuniary damage." Films of Distinction, Inc. 
v. Allegro Film Prods., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
1. Particularity 
TP-Link argues that TSI’s trade libel claim is insufficient alleged because 
TSI has failed to identify the “author or speaker, recipient, and location of each 
allegedly libelous statement by Defendants, and has not pled facts sufficient to 
 
11 Hand & Nail Harmony, Inc. v. ABC Nails & Spa Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188902, at 
*13 (C.D. CA  2016).   
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demonstrate the falsity of any alleged complaints to Amazon.”  Not true: TSI has 
identified TP-Link/Amazzia as the speaker and Amazon the recipient. SAC ¶28 
TSI lists 28 IP complaints, their dates, and email address of the IP reporter. Exhibit 
8.1-8.4 are four (4) true copies of Policy Warnings TSI received from Amazon, 
confirming the conspirators’ “counterfeit” complaints.   Since TP-Link is in privity 
of contract with Amazon, SAC at ¶38, it follows that under Evidence Rule 
801(d)(2)(C) Amazon’s statements to TSI are non-hearsay and admissible to prove 
what TP-Link stated to Amazon, i.e. “counterfeit.” 
2. Falsity 
As to facts demonstrating falsity, TSI plausibly alleges  (SAC at ¶49) that 
[a]ll [of TSI’s TP-Link products] were authentic and TP-Link has never stated to 
the contrary;” and in SAC ¶27 TSI asserts that “Plaintiff has possession of 
approximately 100 of these items to date, all of which are authentic and not 
counterfeit.”  Again, having repeatedly alleged the “counterfeit” complaints to be 
false, Plaintiff need not prove authenticity at the pleading stage.  Both California 
and federal law assume that people act lawfully unless proven otherwise. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides that illegality is an affirmative defense to be 
pled in the defendant's answer.  Rock River Communs., Inc. v. Universal Music 
Grp., Inc., 745 F.3d 343, 350 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The question is “plausibility.” TP-Link has not to date, though having test 
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purchased TSI product on four (4) occasions, alleged TSI’s products to be 
counterfeit.  Until it does, TSI’s assertions of authenticity must be taken as 
unchallenged and true.  Id.   See also TechnoMarine S.A. v. Giftports, Inc., 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130128, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)( (“equally plausible that 
defendant . . . lawfully acquired the subject watches and is simply reselling them, 
as it has a right to do.").  
3. Actual Malice  
SAC ¶¶32, 49, 56, and 63 each allege actual malice based upon alleged facts 
in yet other paragraphs of the SAC.  These allegations of malice rest upon the 
sheer number of IP complaints, assertions of counterfeiting contrary to the results 
of their own test purchases, refusal to engage with TSI in search of the truth, and 
the actual ill will that must accompany the foregoing.  All 28 IP complaints can be 
found malicious under the allegations of the SAC. 
4. Causation. 
TSI very specifically and plausibly alleged causation: “Amazon harshly 
enforces brand owner complaints of counterfeiting” (SAC at ¶1, 4th bullet); TP-
Link lodged about 28 counterfeiting complaints (Id. at ¶28);  Amazon routinely 
sent Policy Warnings (Exhibits 8.1-8.4) threatening expulsion; and Plaintiff, 
unable to obtain TP-Link’s cooperation, was ultimately expelled. TP-Link also 
argues that Plaintiff, not TP-Link/Amazzia, is responsible for its misfortune.  As 
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shown above, such an argument is  (i) an affirmative defense, (ii) does not go to 
the pleadings, (iii) at best premature and ill-suited for ruling in the Rule 12(b)(6) 
context, and (i) wrong in fact. 
E. Tortious Interference 
1.  Wrongful Act. 
TSI has adequately addressed the highly culpable nature of  
Defendants’ conduct in IV.C. above: “Authorities to Date Deny Rule 12 (b)(6) 
Motions”  . . . and this Court has ruled in judicial dicta that an accusation of 
counterfeiting is a “wrongful act.”  We incorporate that discussion at this point. 
2.  Casuation. 
We incorporate argument advanced in IV.B. and IV.D.4 above. 
F.  Antitrust, Section 1-Sherman Act, Naked Restraint 
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a per se Section 1 Sherman Act claim.12  
Defendants "had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to 
achieve an unlawful objective." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1471, 79 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1984).  The unlawful objective 
 
12 To state a claim under Section 1, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, will prove: (1) the 
existence of a conspiracy, (2) intention on the part of the co-conspirators to restrain trade, and (3) 
actual injury to competition. Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008), 
Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 501-02 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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was the “removal of MAP violators.”  United States v. General Motors Corp, 384 
U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
Defendants do not contest the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Section 1 claim aside 
from the requirements of joint/concerted action and horizontality. Specifically, 
they contest being competitors capable of entering into a conspiracy to violate the 
antitrust laws.  We agree that TP-Link’s instant arguments put into play Amazzia’s 
status as a competitor; but we suggest that meeting TP-Link’s new defensive 
matter was not required to state a claim in the first instance. See Gomez v. Toledo, 
446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980) (finding "no basis for 
imposing on plaintiff an obligation to anticipate [an affirmative] defense by stating 
in his complaint" its negative.).  We did not anticipate that that Defendants would 
claim to be a “single entity.” 
In making their argument TP-Link/Amazzia rely on Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,768 (1984), as applied in Jack Russell 
Terrier Network of Northern Ca. v. American Kennel Club, 407 F.3d 1027, 1034 
(9th Cir. 2005).  The short answer to TP-Link is that Jack Russell by its own terms 
is inapplicable: “"where firms are not an economic unit and are at least potential 
competitors, they are usually not a single entity for anti-trust purposes."  Id.  (bold 
added) 
In truth, Auction Brothers, Inc., dba Amazzia, dba Super Duper Deals and 
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perhaps other fictitious names, has long been a third-party seller—hence, a TP-
Link competitor --on Amazon. Its Amazzia profile as of January 20, 2020 showed 
31,080 ratings or reviews. Schlachet Dec., Exhibit 5. Author Gayle Laakman 
McDowell states that about .5% of purchasers post a review, although some sellers 
post fake reviews at a far greater rate.  https://www.quora.com/What-percentage-
of-buyers-write-reviews-on-Amazon.  Assuming Amazzia is not a “fake reviewer,” 
its review numbers suggest sales of products since 2008 as high as 6,000,000 
items.  Further, as of February 9, 2020 Amazzia (i) is known in the trade as the 
7,639th largest volume Fulfilled by Amazon seller (Schlachet Dec., Exhibit 6), and 
(ii) it was advertising on its own Linkedin site for marketing personnel as of 
January 20, 2020.  Schlachet Dec., Exhibit 7.   
Plaintiff does not agree, moreover, that a service provider and brand owner 
may not jointly conspire and nakedly restrain competition.  In Nexstar Broad., Inc. 
v. Granite Broad. Corp., No. 1:11-CV-249 RM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95024, at 
**25, 26 (N.D. Ind. 2012) plaintiff joined an advertising representative and station 
owner upon allegations of per se Section 1liability.  The District Court denied the 
motion to dismiss: “Nexstar's conspiracy claims ‘plausible’. Nothing more is 
required at this stage of the proceedings.” 
 And assuming arguendo that only competitors can conspire, plaintiff has 
alleged in SAC ¶41 that “Amazzia directly or indirectly sells products on Amazon 

































MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JOINT NOTICE OF MOTION 
CASE NO.: CV 19-10374 PA 
 
through multiple seller accounts.”  This allegation, ignored by TP-Link, means that 
Amazzia is a competitor, whether actual or potential, in the relevant market of 
online retail sales.  TP-Link as well is an Amazon vendor.  SAC at ¶38.  
Denomination as “actual” or “potential” competitor reflects an entity’s actual or 
potential entry in the relevant market, i.e. not its inventory of products for listing or 
sale at given time.13  Accordingly, Auction Brothers, Inc. is and has been TP-
Link’s actual competitor and potential competitor at the horizontal level.   
 Further, TP-Link’s “single entity” assertions cannot stand in light of  Am. 
Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010),  a Section 1, controlling 
case that Defendants neither cited nor distinguished. The Supreme Court there 
discussed and applied Copperweld where NFL Properties, a licensing joint venture 
that granted an exclusive license to Reebok, was sued under Section 1 by 
American Needle, a former non-exclusive licensee.  NFL sought to evade scrutiny 
as a “single entity” under Copperweld.  The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the 
parties to be separate economic entities.  All decision-making was held to be 
concerted, not independent.  As for the argument that NFL Properties’ concerted 
 
13 Power Analytics Corp. v. Operation Tech., No. SA CV16-01955 JAK (FFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 226665, at *65 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017)( “. . . establish unreasonable barriers to entry in 
the future, a potential competitor might have a legitimate antitrust claim.”) The usage is routine 
and non-controversial: Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen Inc., No. 2:17-00715 WBS EFB, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13548, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018)(“ . . . plaintiff was not a current 
or potential competitor in the alleged market.”) 
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decision-making was in the common interests of the teams, the Court accepted the 
premise but explained that it made no difference: “illegal restraints often are in the 
common interests of the parties to the restraint, at the expense of those who are not 
parties.” Id. at 198. Defendants’ “single entity” argument is governed—and 
rejected--by Am. Needle. 
Under circumstances of Amazzia ascendance, its promotional material and 
an express contract14 followed by higher prices to consumers (SAC at ¶81), an 
unlawful horizontal conspiracy to maintain MAP pricing by excluding competitors 
may be found.  U.S. v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290, aff’g CV-12-2826 (SDNY).   
We acknowledge Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 888, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2007)], where  the Court rejected reliance on 
rules governing horizontal restraints when defining rules applicable to vertical 
price restraints.  Specifically, Leegin overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, which established 
a per se rule against a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its 
distributor to set minimum resale prices.   
However, Leegin  has never been held to overrule cases such as Arnold 
Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986), where 
General Motors and its dealers, admittedly vertical  parties, combined and 
 
14 SAC, Exhibit A to Exhibit 9: “a true and correct copy of TP-Link’s contract with Amazzia.” 
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conspired, without an express agreement, to restrict marketplace access.  GM was 
held not to have acted independently and was denied summary judgment.  Thus,  
Leegin does not control a per se challenge to a hybrid conspiracy amongst 
horizontal competitors to exclude discounters.15 The instant conspiracy isn’t about 
vertical price setting, but rather, it’s about horizontal competitors destroying 
competition at the horizontal level and stabilizing supra-competitive price levels 
within the relevant market. 
G. Declaratory Judgement  
Space limitations preclude a full discussion of Plaintiff’s allegations in 
support of a declaratory judgment.  Plaintiff has set forth an adequate basis for 
such relief in SAC at ¶¶88-92. 
H. The Noerr-Pennigton Doctrine does not Shield the Sham at Issue 
from Antitrust Scrutiny 
 
TP-Link seeks safe harbor under Noerr-Pennington 16  by analogizing the 
instant case to non-precedential Hard2Find Accessories, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
 
15 See also Doctor's Hosp. v. Se. Med. All., 123 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 1997)(manufacturer not 
acting unilaterally in best interest); ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 556-57 
(8th Cir. 1991)(though facially vertical, inducement emanated from horizontals’ intent to restrain 
competition); Travelpass Grp. LLC v. Caesars Entm't Corp., No. 5:18-CV-00153-RWS-CMC, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166542, at *5-6 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 27, 2019)(additional horizontal 
secondary conspiracies); In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 
2007)(though complaints vertical, part and parcel of effort to restrain trade); U.S. v. All Star 
Industries, 962 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1992)(cannot escape per se treatment by using a middle man). 
16 E. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523 (1961). 
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691 Fed. App’x 406, 407 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’g 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 160980 (W.D. 
WA 2014), where Apple was protected in its single infringement complaint to 
Amazon.  The analogy fails, however, because, unlike the instant case, the 
Hard2Find Court found that Apple had lodged its IP complaints in good faith and 
plaintiff did not allege Apple’s complaint to be a “sham” or baseless.   TP-Link, 
unlike H2F, was not in good faith; and TSI vigorously disputes, and has pleaded 
with particularity TP-Link’s bad faith throughout.  See SAC at ¶50.   
The Ninth Circuit expounded the Supreme Court’s “sham exception” to 
Noerr-Pennington as follows: “‘ostensibly directed toward influencing 
governmental action . . . is a mere sham to cover to what is actually nothing more 
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor.’ Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.  Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 
531, 534 (9th Cir. 1991)  .  Accordingly, Noerr-Pennigton does not apply here 
because TP-Link’s misconduct was “an attempt to interfere directly” and was not 
genuine petitioning conduct.  Id. 
TSI has specifically pled, non-conclusory, the particulars of the “Sham 
Exception” at SAC ¶50, establishing that the 28 counterfeiting complaints were 
objectively baseless assertions that no reasonable seller could expect to 
successfully advance.  See Prof'l Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60, 113 S. Ct. 1920, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1993).  Indeed, 
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Amazzia’s modus operandi here, i.e. of automatically filing IP complaints until 
removal of the MAP violator, is a scenario that the Ninth Circuit regards as “sham” 
as a matter of law”  Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 
Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Baseless protests, instituted without 
regard to merit, are "nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S. Ct. at 533. 
 Unfortunately Defendants have misrepresented the holding of Rock River 
Communs., Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 745 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 2014), 
representing to the Court that “infringement notice protected by Noerr-Pennigton 
immunity.”  In fact, the Ninth Circuit ruled: “The district court, however, found 
that triable issues of fact prevented summary adjudication of the Noerr-Pennington 
defense, and we agree.”  745 F.3d at 351. 
Should the Court find the record not sufficiently developed to decide 
whether Noerr-Pennington applies, then we respectfully suggest that decision on 
the matter be deferred.  Rock River, supra; see also Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. 
Landis+Gyr Inc., Civil Action No. 6:11-cv-00317-LED-JDL, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 191810, at *22 (E.D. Tex. 2013) 
V. RULE 12(f) ANTI-SLAPP/LITIGATION PRIVILEGE 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. No litigation privilege exists absent a good faith anticipation of 
imminent litigation to resolve a dispute, wholly absent here. 
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 Defendants' statements were not made "in anticipation of litigation", as is 
required for protection under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b)’s litigation privilege. Indeed, 
the statements at issue did not even hint at litigation.  Despite defendants' 
convenient characterization of them as "functional equivalents of cease and desist 
letters," a patent stretch,  TP-Link cannot convert an IP complaint to  
Amazon into threatened litigation against Thimes:  
That is, a lawsuit or some other form of proceeding must actually be 
suggested or proposed, orally or in writing. Without some actual 
verbalization of the danger that a given controversy may turn into a lawsuit, 
there is no unmistakably objective way to detect at what point on the 
continuum between the onset of a dispute and the filing of a lawsuit the 
threat of litigation has advanced from mere possibility or subjective 
anticipation to contemplated reality.  
 
Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 53 Cal. App. 4th 15 - Cal: Court of Appeal, 
1st Appellate Dist., 3rd Div. 1997.17 Defendants have nowhere alleged that a 
 
17 Cited approvingly: Estrada v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 16-cv-04091-LB, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140089, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2016)( "’Good faith’ contemplation of is a question of 
fact.”); GA Escrow, LLC v. Autonomy Corp. PLC, No. C 08-01784 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67996, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2010)(no litigation privilege “until the prospect of litigation has 
gone from being a mere possibility to becoming a contemplated reality.”); Tobin v. BC Bancorp, 
No. 09cv0256 DMS (CAB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010)( “facts 
are clearly in dispute . . . Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on these 
claims.; ) Mezzetti v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 346 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 
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"lawsuit or some other form of proceeding" was "actually suggested or proposed", 
and their litigation privilege claims fail for that reason alone.  
B. Timeliness 
During the Rule 26(f) process in SDNY, on July 27, 2019, TP-Link counsel 
complained that “Plaintiff has not made any settlement demand.  If plaintiff 
identifies its supplier . . . TP-Link USA Corporation is open to early settlement . . 
.” The resultant mediation process, which lasted with intensity from August 9 to 
October 25, 2019, failed to achieve its goal, when TP-Link filed a letter with 
Magistrate Judge Freeman a week before mediation, requesting that further 
mediation efforts be cancelled.18 
TSI’s core allegations at bar have been in litigation, substantially verbatim, 
since May 29, 2019.  Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World 
Evangelism19 adopts a “first opportunity” approach (“ the anti-SLAPP statute is 
designed to resolve these lawsuits early, but not to permit the abuse that delayed 
 
2004)( “mere potential or bare possibility' that judicial proceedings might be instituted' in the 








18 Id. at ECF Nos. 45-47.  
19 4 Cal. 5th 637, 639-640, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 413 P.3d 650 (2018). 
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motions to strike might entail”).  Newport Harbor has been followed by NDCA.20 
That instant plaintiff filed an amended complaint is of no moment because 
successive pleadings are deemed identical if, as here, the “transactional nucleus of 
facts” remains unchanged.  Cf. Kulick v. Leisure Vill. Ass'n, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 113771, at *4 (C.D. Cal.  2018).  Defendants anti-SLAPP motion is 
untimely. 
C. TP-Link’s Challenged Conduct is not anti-SLAPP Protected  
Falsely accusing a business of counterfeiting is wrongful and unprotected as 
“petitioning conduct.”  Eternity Mart, Incopro, and Hand & Nail discussed at p. 
10, supra.  “As Professor McCarthy notes, counterfeiting is the ‘hard core’ or ‘first 
degree’ of trademark infringement that seeks to trick the consumer into believing 
he or she is getting the genuine article, rather than a ‘colorable imitation.’"  Gucci 
Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207, 242 (SDNY 2012).     
Thus, even assuming arguendo that TP-Link would be anti-SLAPP 
“protected” vis-a-vis steps taken as to reporting trademark infringement to 
Amazon, TSI’s instant state law claims do not threaten such activity, but rather, 
instant claims challenge accusations of counterfeiting.  TP-Link has not argued, 
because it cannot argue, that lying about one’s competitors to destroy them is 
 
20 Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 402 F. Supp. 3d 615, 715 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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protected conduct.  There is no privilege in law to kill off the competition with lies 
blocking its access to the marketplace.  
D.  Probability of Prevailing on Counterclaims 
1. The “Probability of Prevailing” Standard 
Where an anti-SLAPP movant shows protected activity (which TP-Link has 
not shown in fact, but which we assume arguendo it has), the burden shifts to the 
claimant to establish a “probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1).  The Ninth Circuit holds that “probability” is not a 
likelihood of success, but rather, a somewhat minimal showing.  See Hilton v. 
Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894,908 (9th Cir. 2010)( "’Reasonable probability' . . . 
requires only a 'minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.”) 
TSI stands on its discussion in Section IV.B.-E. above to establish its 
probability of prevailing on its state law claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Having responded to each of the many issues raised by Defendants, we pray 
that the Court deny the Joint Motion of Defendants in its entirety and, should any 
count warrant dismissal, we request leave to amend the Complaint.21   
 
21 The Court need “not reach  . . .  [here TP-Link’s] argument that—given the horizontal aspect of 
the conspiracy . . .the conspiracy is subject to per se condemnation.”  W. Penn Allegheny Health 
Sys. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 101 n.10 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied UPMC v. W. Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys., 565 U.S. 817, 132 S. Ct. 98 (2011). 
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